abstract This paper examines how interactions between government agencies and banking organizations led to the emergence of commercial banking in the Czech Republic and Hungary during the 1990s. We rely on interviews with bank managers at six large banks, government officers, and experts at other organizations to learn how actions based on different political ideologies shaped the banking field. We integrate prior research on institutional change, political interest, and transition economies to describe the emergence of commercial banking. Three important problems characterized commercial banking in the two countries: the disposal of bad loans, the privatization of banks, and the establishment of banking services. We argue that the solutions to these problems based on the changing political interests of organizational actors and regulators represent the phases of institutional development in commercial banking during the 1990s. Implications of our research are discussed regarding the political perspective of organizational fields in transition economies.
INTRODUCTION
Conflicting political interests have been important forces in the transition from socialism to capitalism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The various problems of transition described in prior research, such as the mixed privatization of state-owned enterprises (e.g. Peng, 2000; Stark, 1996) , organizational adaptation (Clark and Soulsby, 1999a; Newman, 2000) , and challenges of organizational changes (Hoskisson et al., 2000; indicate the different concerns of governmental and organizational actors regarding societal change. Most previous studies on the evolution of market institutions in transition economies, however, have used path dependent explanations (e.g. socialist past) or rational institutional development arguments (e.g. reforms through government policies), leaving only a limited role for different actors (Czaban and Whitley, 2000) . In addition to the socialist past and governmental reforms, institutions and organizational fields in transition economies may also be influenced by interactions and negotiations between governmental and organizational actors.
Organizational fields are clusters of 'those organizations that, in aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life ' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148) . Fields in institutional theory are broader than industries. They include organizations, related actors, and regulatory agencies that interact based on their 'shared cognitive or normative frameworks or a common regulative system' (Scott, 1995, p. 56) . When institutions are not well defined, different political ideologies, the sets of beliefs and associated attitudes in a society, by organizational and governmental actors may define the meaning of the field and set its boundaries (Fine and Sandstrom, 1993; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Simons and Ingram, 1997) . To investigate how this process takes place and leads to the emergence of organizational fields is important for the better understanding of institutional development in transition economies (Meyer and Peng, 2005) . Studies on emerging organizational fields in transition economies may also add useful empirical evidence to recent conceptual frameworks of political interests in institutional theory (e.g. Henisz and Zelner, 2005) .
This study makes a contribution to the literature by highlighting the role of political interests in the development of commercial banking in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Political interests in this context are the concerns by different actors to select policy options that provide desirable solutions to the problems of commercial banking. Political interests are rooted in the ideas and beliefs of actors about the field and its set of rules (Simons and Ingram, 1997) . Specifically, we address the following questions: (1) How do organizational and governmental actors define the boundaries and the rules of a field after a societal discontinuity? (2) How do different political interests help to provide solutions to emerging problems in a field?
Our inquiry focuses on the changes in regulatory structures as forms of institutional change [1] (Oliver, 1991) . We report interview details on the interchange of government agencies and organizations with respect to the new commercial banking field in transition economies. In contrast to differing accounts in the literature (e.g. Hanley et al., 2002; Sachs, 1996; Stark and Bruszt, 1998) , we argue that commercial banking has only partially emerged from programmed governmental policies or historic patterns. We find that the development of the banking field is influenced by political interests of organizational and governmental actors, who are involved in solving different problems of banking. The outcomes of their negotiations represent the development of the field.
Our research is based on a longitudinal field study of six large banks, government agencies, and other organizations. Given the short history of banks and market institutions in the Czech Republic and Hungary, we chose the inductive approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) . This study adds a different perspective to the literature on transition economies by shifting the focus from the changes in organizational structures to a co-evolutionary view of organizational fields (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) . Furthermore, this study extends previous research on institutions in transition economies (e.g. Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Dunn, 1999; Wright et al., 2005) by examining the role of political interests (e.g. Ingram and Inman, 1996; Lounsbury et al., 2003) . This study also departs from previous research on transition economies by following a problem-driven approach (Davis and Marquis, 2005) . Although our research is grounded in previous theoretical perspectives, we do not seek to use the banking field to test hypotheses developed in other research settings. Our concern here is to explain why and how different actors influence an organizational field's development.
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Political interests are embedded in social structures that link different actors and influence their collective action (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Laumann and Knoke, 1987) . When societal actors manoeuvre based on their political interests, they normally follow their ideologies or beliefs about desirable outcomes in the social world (Simons and Ingram, 1997) . Ideology is 'a set of interconnected beliefs and their associated attitudes, shared by members of a group or population, that relate to problematic aspects of social and political topics' (Fine and Sandstrom, 1993, p. 24) . Discussed by the early French materialist philosophers (e.g. de Tracy), the term 'ideology' was first aimed at the development of 'scientific ideas as the basis of political order' (Kinloch, 1981, p. 5) . Even though ideologies are often based on logic and scientific claims, they are more likely used to ground political actions in rational principles (Fine and Sandstrom, 1993; Keohane, 1976) .
Political ideologies are ideologies about political-economic systems and are usually targeted at changing power structures by coercing states into policy changes (Simons and Ingram, 1997) . Political interests are constrained to a specific policy domain or a common orientation among different actors who select certain policy options to address problems. Actors can represent various organizations and groups and their interests in an issue define 'the level of concern and attention that is prepared to exercise regarding that issue's resolution' (Laumann et al., 1985, p. 2) . Organizations are also often viewed as political conceptions resulting from conscious negotiations by their actors (Lucas, 1987) . Organizational actors, however, also frequently interact with authoritative actors, including government officers (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) . Government officers as actors have a double role as they set constraints for others in the society while pursuing their own political interests (Ingram and Clay, 2000) . Political interest may be rooted in economic behaviour; however, it likely includes broader concerns and beliefs (Fligstein, 1996; Lachmann, 2003; Simons and Ingram, 1997) . Beyond economic self-interest, political interest may include cultural beliefs, views about the society, values, and ethical considerations (Feldman, 1982) .
Early research on institutional change did not consider the political interests of different actors. According to early accounts, institutional change is a process that leads to an economically optimal solution for all actors involved. North (1990) , for example, argues that institutions develop to overcome economic inefficiencies in markets. More recently, research on institutional change has started to acknowledge the role of political interests by different actors (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; . Along this line, Dowell et al. (2002) illustrated how new technologies in the high-definition television industry developed into standard applications through political actions.
Political interests to modify institutions in a field may originate from three main sources: external societal goals, organizational actors, and the interaction between organizational and societal interests. In most prior studies, institutions in a field change because of external societal goals. These changes typically take place because of the diffusion of norms from different institutional spheres, such as political interests by actors who advocate national or international policies. Dobbin and Dowd (1997) , for instance, found that pro-cartel policies, public capitalization, and antitrust legislations influenced the number of railroad foundings and thus created incentives and constraints for competition.
Political interests of organizational actors are also an important source of institutional change. Managers may want to manipulate institutions to reduce the burden of their organization's adaptation to an unfavourable environment (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Laumann et al., 1985) . By receiving government protection from market forces, requesting subsidies, or charging competitors with antitrust violations, organizational actors can alter the conditions of their environment, thereby reducing their dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Holm (1995) described how institutions evolve -how institutions have grown and collapsed as a result of changing interests, ideas, and practices by organizational actors. Hoffman (1999) illustrated how simultaneously existing ideas of environmentalism evolved from collective actions by organizational actors in the US chemical industry. Ingram and Inman (1996) showed that the emergence of institutions based on actions by organizational players offered an effective solution to the tragedy of commons in the Niagara Falls area hotel industry by limiting the aggressive profiting from tourists and providing a favourable business environment.
Modifying institutions by external political interests and by organizational level interests in a field are unidirectional changes. Different political interests that advocate societal and organizational goals, however, may have an interactive effect on an organizational field. Oliver (1991) , for instance, developed theory on organizational responses to institutional processes by integrating institutional and resource dependence theories. Drawing on Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) notion of 'negotiated environment', she suggested that organizational managers may respond to conflicting institutional demands by bargaining with their external constituents. Such bargaining allows managers to reduce their organizations' need to comply when government policies are modified (Oliver, 1991) . More recently, Henisz and Zelner (2005) illustrated how political bargaining can result in iterative institutional change processes in the context of emergent institutions.
The importance of the interactive examination of organizational level and societal level political interests is further demonstrated by recent research on co-evolution (e.g. Lewin and Kim, 2004) . Using a co-evolutionary perspective, Djelic and Ainamo (1999) found that environmental transformation and organizational change in the international fashion industry resulted in different organizational solutions. These researchers argued that early organizational solutions by pioneer firms led to new constraints for other organizations within the industry. Similarly, showed the interdependent relationships among organizational adaptation, competitive dynamics, and the evolution of institutional systems. In their study of the early thrift industry, Haveman and Rao (1997) argued that pressures for technical efficiency and institutional appropriateness were both important forces shaping the content of organizational and institutional co-evolution.
The interaction between organizational and governmental actors motivated by their different political interests may be more pronounced in transition economies, where organizational fields develop simultaneously and a wide range of societal institutions are not defined (Child and Tsai, 2005; Whitley and Czaban, 1998) . As these economies make their transition from socialism to a market system, new institutions may be created through the interaction of government officers and organizational managers. Organizational fields in transition economies may start out with some general rules adopted from successful practices of developed economies. It is quite likely, however, that the lack of clear institutional definitions will magnify the importance of political ideologies.
BACKGROUND OF TRANSITION ECONOMIES
The system of central planning provided a fertile ground for the rise of powerful political interests in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In this system, organizations were closely tied to the government and its ministries. Market mechanisms, such as demand, price, and competition were insignificant. Decision-making at the organizational level about production and pricing was limited as all firms were only production units within the central planning system (Estrin, 2002) . The relationship between organizations and the government was characterized by paternalism, soft budget constraint, and bargaining (Kornai, 1992) . To satisfy the production requirements set by the central plan, firm managers bargained for resources from government agencies. If they had financial problems, firms received additional resources in the forms of direct financial subsidies and indirect preferential treatments. The institutionalized help from the state encouraged managers to take high risks in their investment and production decisions. Frequent shortages led managers to endless bargaining with the state and overstocking of scarce resources (Gomulka, 1986; Kornai, 1992) .
The socialist system collapsed in most of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s because of economic inefficiencies, unsuccessful reforms, and political crises. The resulting institutional changes have been dramatic, rapid, and extensive (Lavigne, 1995) . The term 'transition' refers to the replacement of the central planning mechanism with the institutions of successful market economies, rather than designing a more efficient system from scratch (Allsopp and Kierzkowski, 1997) . The process involves a shift in political power from socialists to the supporters of the market system, the distribution of property rights from state to private parties, and the change in coordination mechanism from bureaucratic to market coordination (Kornai, 2000) .
Recent studies have provided different accounts of market development in transition economies. Researchers from the political economy perspective emphasize the role of local governments, consultants, and international financial institutions in changing institutions by means of economic reforms (e.g. Hanley et al., 2002) . Other researchers trace the path of changes back to the socialist society (e.g. Stark, 1996) . A study by McDermott (1997) , for example, explains the failures of the privatization programme in the Czech Republic owing to the strong web of connections from the past. The different explanations in previous studies are partly due to the evolutionary characteristic of institutional changes. Institutional changes are evolutionary in transition economies because 'administered economies broke down macrostructures, thereby creating space for micro worlds to produce autonomous effects that may have unexpected influence over the structures that have been emerging' (Burawoy and Verdery, 1999, p. 2) . Such autonomous effects may foster economic efficiency in different ways and lead to a variety of outcomes in economic systems (Grabher and Stark, 1997) .
Even though these unexpected institutional effects on organizational adaptation have been demonstrated by previous studies (e.g. Clark and Soulsby, 1999b; Czaban and Whitley, 2000; Spicer et al., 2000) , little research has focused on the directions of institutional changes resulted from organizational level pressures. Organizational changes, however, are likely interdependent with institutional change (Oliver, 1991) and a co-evolutionary examination is particularly pertinent in transition economies (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Peng, 2003) . Furthermore, studying interdependent changes in organizational fields is preferable to organizational-level analysis in this context because 'a field-level approach is especially appropriate during unsettled times' (Davis and Marquis, 2005, p. 337) .
In addition to its organizational-level focus, previous research has offered few explanations for the direction of institutional changes in transition economies. Most prior work, for example, has proposed or provided tests of theories developed in the context of developed market economies and presented limited explanations on why and how institutions and organizations co-evolve in transition economies. Problem-driven research, which is oriented towards explaining events, may offer further details on local institutional development during economic transition. To provide a comprehensive account of institutional development, however, problem-driven research needs to direct its investigation to certain social mechanisms in organizational fields (Davis and Marquis, 2005) . Political interests by different actors may be good indicators of social mechanisms that shape institutions and organizations in emerging fields, including commercial banking in transition economies.
RESEARCH SETTING
The commercial banking sector emerged in both the Czech Republic and Hungary in the late 1980s. Under central planning, the national bank assisted the state plan by providing low-cost credit to local industries (Saunders and Sommariva, 1993; Snyder and Kormendi, 1997) . If a firm needed funds to purchase supplies as specified in the state plan, it could borrow without restrictions or performance requirements (McKinnon, 1991) . On the deposit side, accounts built up until firms were allowed to buy resources or until the accounts were simply expropriated by government agencies.
Banks in the central planning system acted as accounting divisions of the central bank by keeping track of the planned allocations of resources (Claessens, 1996) . Bankers working in the national bank performed functions similar to bureaucrats in the ministries of finance and planning. Those who were involved in lending monitored the firms' operation by frequent on-site visits and arranged government financing for the firms' projects. Because of the intertwined links among the management of state-owned enterprises, government agencies, and the Communist Party, actions were rarely taken in the central bank to resolve financial problems (Kornai, 1992) . When problems arose, the management of the firm and representatives of government agencies worked out additional loans or adjusted the terms on existing loans (Claessens, 1996) .
The problem of mixing monetary policy and lending was emphasized repeatedly in various reform proposals. However, the creation of commercial banks was expected to result in bankruptcies, unemployment, and shortages that could have easily turned into widespread political unrest (Steinherr, 1997) . It was not until the mid-1980s that the macroeconomic benefits of the two-tier banking system outweighed the potential dangers to the political regime (Van Wijnbergen, 1997) . For example, Hungary by this time was unable to borrow additional funds from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to keep its inefficient state-owned enterprises alive without promising significant reforms. Following long political debates within the communist parties, a two-tier banking system was founded in 1987 in Hungary and 1989 in the Czech Republic.
After the collapse of socialism, the newly created banking sector experienced many critical changes. In the Czech Republic, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth rate declined from about 2 per cent in 1989 to -11 per cent in 1992. The country's macroeconomic environment was characterized by relatively little foreign debt and low unemployment rate compared to other Central European countries (Svejnar, 2002) . Although the country made significant progress in the area of privatization by 1995 (e.g. 60 per cent of the GDP), its public-spending remained around 50 per cent of the GDP (Sachs, 1996) . Bankruptcy law, price liberalization, and privatization policies were introduced in the Czech Republic in 1991 (Takla, 1994) . The short-term effects of price liberalization were an inflation rate of 58 per cent and currency devaluation (Desai, 1995) . Participation in the mass privatization of the largest state industries represented a mixed growth opportunity for the banking sector. State-owned firms were sold through vouchers, investment funds, and banks (Clark and Soulsby, 1999b; McDermott, 1997) . Despite the weakened dominance of direct state ownership, voucher privatization has left the bulk of economic activity under a 'thick network of bank and state control' (Brom and Orenstein, 1994, p. 919) . Other significant changes in the Czech banking sector included the split of Czech and Slovak financial markets and the opening of the Prague Stock Exchange (Takla, 1994 ).
Hungary's GDP per capita growth rate reached its minimum in 1993 at -11.74 per cent, similar to the negative growth rate of the Czech Republic for the same period. The country also experienced high unemployment and external debt (e.g. over 50 per cent of its GDP in 1990) (Svejnar, 2002 ). Hungary's economy was also characterized by a public spending of over 50 per cent in 1994 (Sachs, 1996) . The most important institutional changes for the Hungarian banking sector included a deregulated price system, a capital market for private investors, privatization, and liberalization of foreign direct investment (Székely and Newberry, 1993) . Price deregulation resulted in a strong pressure on inflation (e.g. 34 per cent in 1991). Privatization policies in Hungary favoured foreign direct investment because of high levels of national debt, lack of currency convertibility, and lack of local capital (Filatotchev et al., 2003) . By the end of the 1990s, the majority of firms were privately owned with a substantial share of foreign ownership (Csite and Kovách, 1999) . The share of private ownership in Hungary exceeded 60 per cent in 1995 and reached about 85 per cent of the GDP by the end of the decade. The revenues obtained from privatization were used to repay the national debt. The inflow of foreign direct investment transferred state ownership into the hands of multinational firms and thus reduced the lending role of the local banking sector (Hanley et al., 2002) .
Beyond the general institutional changes in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the emergence of commercial banks was shaped by various problems of lending and new legislations targeted at banking. Based on our interview evidence, we focus on the disposal of bad loans, bank privatization, and establishment of banking services.
METHODOLOGY
We employed a longitudinal multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) because of the short history of commercial banking in transition economies and the lack of prior empirical evidence on its emergence. We found this qualitative approach particularly useful because of the limited theoretical explanations on the development of organizational fields and our interest in field development over time. Furthermore, survey instruments from developed countries often provide limited help to study institutional development in transition economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000) . Similar inductive study designs were used in other previous studies on organizational adaptation in this context (e.g. Czaban and Whitley, 2000; Peng, 1997; Stark, 1996) .
Field observations and interviews were completed at six large banks and other organizations related to the banking sectors in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1995 and 1999. Table I provides a summary of the banks in the study. The selected six banks were typical large local banks. The banking sectors in both countries are concentrated with a few large players and some smaller banks with limited services. Multinational banks entered the two countries through acquisition of local banks. Our selection allowed us to gain access to top managers and to visit banking operations. Although questions about political interests and organizational adaptation can in general be sensitive, cooperation for the purpose of academic research by managers working under constant changes involves high level of trust and significant amount of time. Though access to in-depth data is perhaps the most important standard of qualitative studies, a diverse sample can further increase the benefits of this research design ( Yin, 1994) . Our sample satisfied this criterion as the selected banks represented a variety of backgrounds and business profiles.
The main source of our information was semi-structured interviews. In order to increase validity, we completed multiple interviews in each bank. We interviewed three to six top managers per bank, including the chief executive officer (CEO), vice presidents, and directors of functional areas. The first interview was with the CEO or senior vice presidents in most cases. The study included 77 semi-structured interviews: 58 at the six banks and 19 with government officers and experts at other organizations. These outside interviews were in the central banks of the countries, two government agencies, branches of two multinational banks, a consultant firm, and two universities. Of the 58 interviews with bank managers, we completed 28 in 1995 and 30 in 1999. We made attempts to interview the same managers in 1995 and 1999 and were able to do so in 22 cases. We interviewed 11 government officers and banking experts in 1995 and 8 in 1999. Table II shows the number of interviews and titles of respondents.
The interviews averaged about 90 minutes in length and ranged from one hour to almost three hours. We took notes at all and used a tape recorder at 73 interviews. The interviews were completed in Hungarian in Hungary and in English in the Czech Republic. Although completing the interviews in the managers' native language in the Czech Republic as well would have been preferable, responding to our questions in English did not seem to be a problem for the managers. We prepared an interview protocol using open-ended questions. We asked executives to describe the changes in the banking sector. Specifically, we asked bank executives: (1) to identify the changes that affected their bank the most; (2) to characterize the changeexperience from their bank's point of view; (3) if they considered the changes as opportunities or threats; (4) how bank employees were affected; (5) if the changes required policy changes or operational adjustments; and (6) if their bank tried to cope internally or using outside resources. After gaining an understanding of their view of emerging banking institutions and the effects on their bank, we asked them to discuss: (1) the change processes; (2) the changes in their competitive position; (3) the changes in their bank's strengths; and (4) their interactions with government officers. We asked government officers and industry experts about: (1) their view of banking regulations; (2) the development of laws; (3) their assessment of the banks' adaptation; and (4) their interactions with bankers. During our second visit in 1999, our protocol included similar questions and focused on the institutional and organizational changes that took place since 1995.
To supplement the interview evidence, we sought information from alternative sources. We learned about important macroeconomic and political considerations in the field by collecting archival data on institutional changes, bank performance, and competitiveness. Archival data were obtained from two national banks, governmental agencies, industry and annual reports, and business publications for the period 1986-98. We also completed field observations at the headquarters and large branches of each bank in both 1995 and 1999 to gain further understanding of changes in banking services.
Analysis involved categorizing and comparing the interview transcripts and other data and discovering patterns (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . The interviews were interpreted through our discussions with academics from local universities and international experts on transition economies. Using multiple interviews and other data, we summarized the information about each bank in the form of case write-ups (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Inconsistencies about the banks and the two banking sectors were corrected through repeated contact with the respondents. Clarification from respondents as well as interpretations by experts resulted in an iterative qualitative data analysis involving both empirical evidence and theory. Through these iterations, three common issues of institutional changes emerged: the problem of bad loans; the privatization of banks; and the establishment of banking services. These issues provided blocks to a framework, which was used to examine the emergence of commercial banking and the role of political interests.
FINDINGS Bad Loan Problem
Commercial banks in the study were founded at the end of the 1980s to serve their main customer groups, including industrial and agricultural customers and households. Only two banks, Živnostenská Banka (ZB) in the Czech Republic and Magyar Kül-kereskedelmi Bank (MKB) in Hungary, had had some limited banking experience from the socialist era by handling the hard-currency accounts of a small, privileged group of local citizens. Since each new commercial bank was designated to serve a specific economic sector, banks inherited all large corporate customers of the former national bank in that sector. Most large state-owned enterprises had been insolvent for several years and operated only by means of government subsidies. Subsidies were often given in the form of loans by the branches of the former mono-bank. Because of the small likelihood of repayment, most of these loans soon became bad or 'non-performing' loans. The growing size of the bad loan portfolio increased the state deficit and thus led to further cutbacks in other areas. The interest of government officers was to ease the constant monetary restrictions by freeing the state budget from the bad loans. Distributing the bad loans of large industrial enterprises among the new commercial banks provided tangible benefits to government officers; it allowed them to reduce the deficit in the state budget and to demonstrate the effectiveness of government policy. Changing the ownership of the bad loans, however, did not lead to improved efficiency for the firms.
Shortly after the founding of the banks, the socialist system collapsed. The newly elected governments in the Czech Republic and Hungary followed radically different political ideologies than their communist predecessors. Their ideas about how commercial banking should develop to facilitate economic growth, however, were limited. Their views were shaped by their prior socialist experience and relatively narrow knowledge of foreign banking regulations. The general lack of financial resources available to government officers was a further constraint to their ideas on the development of commercial banking. Instead, government officers saw the funding of commercial banks as a shortterm solution to the problems in the local economy. To keep inefficient industries operating, the Hungarian and Czech governments requested banks to continue to serve their large state-owned corporate customers. Government officers wanted to get higher bids from foreign investors for their nearly bankrupt companies. They also tried to avoid the potential political turmoil because of the collapse of unionized heavy industries. The ambiguous rules in the early 1990s provided an opportunity to use the governments' requests in negotiating with bank executives about the future of their banks. Many bank managers expected benefits in return for their help to the governments. Others were willing to help to save their jobs and to obtain resources for future financial problems. As an area director in Hungary told us at the time of our first visit:
At the top [in the government] they wanted us to be better bankers and solve the problems from the past. But even if we wanted to, we couldn't say no to the big firms. When we tried, we got phone calls from the Ministry on the next day telling us to give them the loans. They were not ready to let the big ones fail.
The transfer of bad loans, however, led to financial problems at the banks, and soon they all requested government help. From the constant lobbying, government officers learned that policies needed to be modified. According to an officer of the Hungarian National Bank we interviewed in 1995:
We were overly optimistic about solving all of our past problems with these new commercial banks. In reality, our problems got worse. We could not monitor the decisions of all the banks, and we saw their results only when it was too late. We had to realize that this [dividing the bad loans among the banks] was not the right solution.
Bank managers lobbied for modifications in banking regulations. They were convinced that the government would have no choice but to put the burden on the state budget rather than on the new commercial banks. For a promised change in the laws, bank managers offered to examine their loan portfolio and to separate the nonperforming loans. Soon after the change in the banking laws, the bad loans were transferred to subsidiaries within the banks in Hungary. Subsequently, bonds were issued to cover the losses, and the National Bank of Hungary purchased these bonds. The government in the Czech Republic followed a similar policy by establishing a stateowned bank to consolidate the bad loans from the commercial banks. The state-owned Konsolidační Banka became the fifth largest bank in 1994 in terms of its portfolio of assets (Brom and Orenstein, 1994) . Bank managers in the Czech Republic were also able to win rights to participate in the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Some of the bad loans were written off for ownership stakes in large firms. As a result of their negotiations with government officers, several banks grew into significant shareholders of industrial firms.
The bad loan problem has led to a further important development in commercial banking. Bank managers knew that they could not bargain for future bail-outs and thus they were unwilling to provide low-cost, and often high-risk, loans to firms. The business environments of the two countries were in general risky for banks because of the high number of start-ups and the restructurings of old state-owned enterprises. The banks' risk-averse behaviour became the roadblock of economic growth by 1995 (The Economist, 2001). As a result, local firms and start-ups turned to multinational banks for necessary capital. Because of their excess capital and willingness to take risks, newly entered multinational banks soon became the providers of loans to local firms. These banks also supplied capital to local firms indirectly through their existing client base of foreign companies entering the region. Even though governments in Hungary and the Czech Republic had started out with a protectionist sentiment, by the end of the bad loan era in the mid 1990s they had to acknowledge a new scenario of corporate lending governed by multinational banks. Figure 1 summarizes the antecedents of the bad loan problem, the interactions between government officers and bankers to draft banking institutions and establish banking organizations, and the specific outcomes of the bad loan problem. Although government officers saw the general benefits of a well functioning commercial banking in the early 1990s, their interest was to find viable solutions to the bad loans. Thus, their concept of how commercial banks should operate was influenced by their negotiations with the banks over bad loans. As the amount of bad loans increased, bank mangers were able to put additional pressure on government officers to change banking regulations and to work out alternative solutions, including loan consolidation and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The change in the views of government officers resulted in additional changes in banking, such as new organizations for debt consolidation, increased government intervention, and risk-aversion in lending by commercial banks (see list of outcomes in Figure 1 ). Risk-aversion by the banks and further concerns about lending led government officers to modify banking regulations and to allow multinational banks to enter the local banking sector.
Privatization of the Banks
The scope and means of private ownership were among the most important subjects of political debate in transition economies. According to our interviews with academics and central bankers in 1995, government officers started out with a strong opposition to private ownership in commercial banking. By transferring the banks to private owners, government officers believed that they could lose their political influence with respect to future financial help to troubled companies. In addition, substantial capital was needed for the banks' privatization. The change in their thinking resulted from the emerging problems of the banking sector. A central banker in the Czech Republic related the change in his approach to privatization by the mid 1990s:
First, we wanted to build a Czech banking sector and didn't want any multinationals here. We thought that their access would lead to costly loans and inflation but soon we learned that these banks could offer things that we just didn't have here . . . Even if we were afraid of them in the first place, we had to make adjustments [in the laws] to allow them to operate.
For government officers, privatization initially had only long-term benefits since the short-term cost of cleaning the balance sheets (e.g. the additional state funds to improve the banks' attractiveness as acquisition targets) was too high. Furthermore, privatization was not an attractive option to government officers whose positions were greatly affected by a fast-changing political arena. Because of the short history of market reforms their expertise were deemed replaceable during governmental changes. Their tenure likely lasted only for a maximum of four years, as the power shifted between different political parties in both the Czech Republic and Hungary. Nevertheless, the high costs of bank bail-outs, the weak service local banks offered, and the general risk-aversion in lending led government officers to focus on the sale of the banks to multinationals. Furthermore, the privatization involved hard currency income, an important concern for governments in transition economies.
Bank managers had a different stake in privatization. At the time of our initial interviews, managers expected that ownership by multinational banks would limit their freedom as these owners tended to monitor the use of their resources more closely than the state did. The growing governmental intervention to solve the bad loan problem, however, started to make privatization by multinational banks an attractive scenario to local bank managers. In addition, bank managers expected to improve the legitimacy of their banks with both customers and the government through the expertise of foreign banks. After government officers agreed in the principles of private ownership, local bank managers became proactive players in the privatization. During our second round of interviews we learned that managers hoped to be able to secure their jobs and save their independence by seeking potential buyers for their banks.
Multinational banks were interested in expanding their network to the Czech Republic and to Hungary and thus sought to acquire large players in the local banking sector. Privatization by multinational banks, however, did not result in substantial capital injection. The new multinational owners encountered many problems in the two countries during the late 1990s. They did not know the local market conditions well, overestimated the growth of customer demand and the market position of the local banks, and underestimated the financial problems of local banks. Managers of multinational banks in 1999 also felt that they did not receive sufficient information from government officers and local bankers, banking regulations were ambiguous, and local governments were unwilling to help them to restructure the banks. The Hungarian government used payments from the banks' privatization to subsidize other troubled industries and pay back national debt. Beyond government spending, some of the funds were diluted in the Czech Republic through privatization schemes (Rao and Hirsch, 2003; Takla, 1994) .
An outcome of the privatization for the local banks was that they increased their acceptance in the home market through their new multinational owners. However, in return they had to give up their independence. From being important local players in the early 1990s, Central European banks became subsidiaries of multinational banks by the end of the decade and most strategic decisions about the local market were made in the headquarters of the multinational banks. On the one hand, local managers often felt that the banks' business problems were due to the wrong decisions being made at headquarters. The foreign management, on the other hand, blamed the locals for the poor implementation of originally good ideas. Government officers did not always act as the best agents of the state property but the privatization process appeared to shape their vision of commercial banking. As government officers and industry consultants related in 1995, their first idea was to create an operating banking system, and they were unaware of the possible variations in different banking models. As we learned in 1999, the benefits of different banking models became evident through the privatization of banks. Figure 2 lists the antecedents and outcomes related to bank privatization. Risk-averse behaviour, liberalization to allow the entry of foreign banks, changes in economic conditions, and increasing customer demand became the antecedents of this phase and thus the political drivers of bank privatization. As a result of intense negotiations between government officers and bank managers from 1994 to 1997, institutions and commercial banks became more clearly defined. Outcomes of bank privatization included increased foreign ownership, reduced government influence, and lack of new capital investments. The privatization of banks also showed the benefits and problems of different banking models, another important outcome of this phase (see list of outcomes in Figure 2 ).
Commercial Banking Services
The original idea of banking sector development in the early 1990s received meaning through solutions given to the bad loan problem, to bank privatization, and to the establishment of modern banking services by the late 1990s. As the transition from plan to market progressed, a new generation of local customers emerged with demand for complex loan products and banking technology. In 1999, a manager in Hungary described the following changes since our first meeting:
In terms of banking services, we have made big progress. Take credit cards, for example. Stores didn't even have multiple phone lines in the past. When somebody tried to pay with a EuroCard, life stopped at the register until the store manager approved the transaction. But local people wanted to own these cards. Our new debit cards are popular. We soon will try [to issue] credit cards too. Deposits were also on the rise. Banks received new deposits owing to the increased confidence in the local financial sector, growing inbound foreign direct investment, and increased monetary stability. Because of the growing number of entrants into banking, local competition for deposits as well as for loans increased. With respect to these changes, bank executives lobbied for new banking regulations to protect their market share. Bankers in Hungary in the late 1990s, for instance, were successful in preventing additional takeovers by foreign banks. In return, the government pressured the banks for assistance with its social policies by offering mortgage products on favourable terms.
The scope of banking services further depended on the type of banking system. Even though the banking sectors in both the Czech Republic and Hungary had evolved significantly by 1999, basic characteristics of local commercial banking were not decided. The early rules of commercial banking had been adopted from the banking systems of successful market economies, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, government officers and banking consultants had no experience about how the laws and regulations should work in practice. As one Czech government officer described the initial ideas of commercial banking:
The government read through the banking legislations of different countries and tried to pick only the laws that were not in conflict with the existing system. The first drafts, therefore, were a mix of inconsistent points that you could not recognize anymore from the sources and were not related to the local reality either.
During the privatization negotiations with multinational banks in the late 1990s, government officers learned that they needed to think about the advantages of British and German banking systems. On the one hand, the British banking system separates brokerage services, commercial banking, and investment banking. German banking traditions, on the other hand, emphasize long-term relationships with firms and universal banking services.
In 1995, there was a general positive sentiment among government officers both in the Czech Republic and in Hungary towards the British banking model because they had knowledge of this banking system. German and Austrian commercial banks, however, became more proactive in the Czech and Hungarian financial markets over time and sought contacts with local banks. In reality, many local bank managers favoured German owners over owners from British banking traditions because of Germany's geographical and cultural proximity. Because local bank managers were actively involved in their banks' privatization, their influence in selecting prospective owners was important. The selection of owners by the local bankers based on their organizational preferences narrowed the governments' choices by 1999. In effect, the political actions of local bank managers influenced the options for the development of the commercial banking field (e.g. German or British banking system).
In addition to influencing broad banking policies, lobbying by bank managers helped to work out the details of new regulations that followed the commercial banking practices in the European Union. In fact, many citizens and the governments in the two countries considered the development of the market system only the necessary price to pay for joining their developed neighbours (Austria and Germany) again. Thus ten years after the start of the transition, developing commercial banking along the rules of the European Union became important for both government officers and bankers. In addition to satisfying existing local regulations, Hungarian bank managers needed to prepare their balance sheets for their multinational owners as well. The differences in reporting led to increased distrust by government officers. As the number of inquiries increased, bank managers started to work with government officers to resolve the differences in accounting policies. The modifications in the local accounting policies helped government officers to better assess the offers by foreign banks and make local banks more attractive acquisition targets by the late 1990s. Figure 3 shows the antecedents and outcomes of the banking sector with the focus on the establishment of modern banking services. The antecedents included some of the important outcomes of the previous bank privatization phase, including increased foreign ownership in local banks and decision involving banking models. Though changes in customer demand continued to be a factor, the entry of foreign banks and economic growth led to a general increase in competition. Another new factor that influenced the views of government officers and bankers was membership in the European Union. Owing to the intense negotiations between governmental and banking actors, institutions and commercial banks became well-defined. Outcomes of this phase included improved banking services and regulations that were consistent with the policies of the European Union. Another important outcome was the development of the commercial banking field towards the German banking model in both countries. The establishment of banking services also resulted in lost independence for local banks and further changes in their ownership by the end of the 1990s.
Today, the Czech and Hungarian commercial banking sectors face a high level of uncertainty. As governments change, privatization policies are reviewed in both countries. Regulatory uncertainty, together with slower economic growth, has prompted some foreign owners to sell their stake in their newly acquired banks. For example, ZB was sold by its German owners (BHF-Bank and Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG) to UniCredito Italiano SpA. IPB's ownership has changed from Nomura to Č SOB, a subsidiary of KBC bank of Belgium. Svejnar notes that the banking fields in the two countries became a laboratory of introducing 'a competitive western banking system with virtually no local banks' (Svejnar, 2002, p. 7) . In addition to the changing ownership, adjustments in the type and amount of services by multinationals create new concerns for government officers in the areas of employment and infrastructure development (e.g. loss of banking services in rural areas). Increased macroeconomic problems also prompted government officers to put pressure on the banks to revise their lending policies. Recent examples of direct government interventions and banking scandals (e.g. IPB in the Czech Republic and Postabank and K&H Bank in Hungary) all indicate the continued role of politics in shaping commercial banking in transition economies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented longitudinal findings on how the commercial banking field evolved from changing ideologies and actions of organizational and governmental actors in economies under transition. The early shift from central planning to a market system in 1989, was followed by an evolution of the banking field in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Whereas the practice of banking under socialism provided little help in developing the banking field, governments had no experience to create missing banking institutions overnight. Our findings indicate that commercial banking evolved from a dynamic bargaining process between government officers and bank managers. Commercial banking started out with vague ideas about regulations and organizations in the early 1990s and bargaining between government officers and managers led to the co-evolution of banking institutions and banks over the decade. Political interests of organizational and governmental actors helped to set the boundaries of the field as well as to gradually define organizations. Bargaining in each phase that we identified concentrated on solutions given to specific banking problems, including bad loans, privatization, and the establishment of services. In the early 1990s, some prior socialist norms of banking, mixed with imported banking institutions, influenced the actors' perception of the field. In addition to these broadly defined ideas of banking, the growing problem of bad loans became the most important factor of negotiations between bankers and government officers. Though some of the outcomes of the bad loan phase were not related to the socialist past or to government policies, they influenced the co-evolution of institutions and organizations. These solutions and other outcomes in turn resulted in new problems as antecedents of subsequent institutional and organizational changes related to the privatization of banks during the mid 1990s. Seeking solutions in this phase resulted in further institutional development as well as the emergence of several new issues. Increased foreign ownership and reduced government involvement, together with the emerging issues of appropriate banking models and membership in the European Union, presented new considerations for the third phase by the end of 1990s. The field's present development is the result of the negotiations between bank managers and government officers over banking services as well as earlier solutions given to specific problems of banking. These findings have the following implications.
In the area of institutional theory, we provide new evidence on how organizational managers make efforts to negotiate their environment when their survival is complicated by institutional change (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Despite an increasing number of studies on institutional change, most prior research focused on institutional effects on organizations and, more recently, on the role of organizational actions in modifying institutions. Our study concentrates on the interactive effect of institutions and organizational actors in a field setting and offers a co-evolutionary perspective (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) . Findings on the development of commercial banking in this study thus add to the relatively limited prior empirical evidence on the co-evolution of institutions and organizations. Because they are characterized by complex and radical institutional changes, emerging fields in transition economies provide attractive settings for future research focusing on co-evolutionary processes.
This study takes prior institutional research further by illustrating the role of political interest in altering institutions in a field. Bargaining about institutions and necessary organizational responses may in general enhance the role of political interests by different institutional constituents (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Simons and Ingram, 1997) . Studying the emerging banking sectors in Hungary and the Czech Republic presents a unique opportunity in this regard. After a discontinuous political change, commercial banking was established without traditions over a relatively short period of time. The political ideologies of policy makers and organizational managers were formed through their interactions with respect to specific issues in the banking sector. As the bargaining led to changes in regulations and organizational behaviour, new issues arose for future bargaining pointing to the direction of an open-ended development of commercial banking.
The process described in this paper differs importantly from previously reported institutional changes in other studies. Most prior studies examined continuous institutional changes in relation to organizational adaptation. Furthermore, intense interactions among organizations, governmental agencies, and other related actors in fields in developed market economies tend to be isolated events and their effects are often modified by the stability of other fields. In contrast, banking in the Czech Republic and Hungary emerged as a result of discontinuous change and further developed in the context of a broad macroeconomic transition. In essence, the development of commercial banking has significant implications for the development of other organizational fields in transition economies as well.
Previous research has already provided compelling results on organizational strategies and institutional changes in transition economies. The present study extends this stream of research in three directions. First, we studied changes at the level of the organizational field rather than changes at the organizational level. Focusing on the organizational field allowed us to outline a more comprehensive framework of institutional change that had been reported in prior studies. As a result, our view of institutions is in contrast with the traditional 'taken-for-granted' nature of institutions in previous studies on transition economies. Importantly, we place emphasis on the cognitive characteristics of institutions and the organizational activism in altering institutions (Oliver, 1991) .
Second, this research adds new explanation to the debate on institutional development in transition economies. Though frameworks based on path dependency and political economy arguments have been helpful in making sense of institutional changes, recent literature on political interests (e.g. Dowell et al., 2002; Fligstein, 1996; Henisz and Zelner, 2005) may provide a complementary explanation of institutional and organizational co-evolution in transition economies. Based on their worldview, different actors may have different stakes in institutional development and their conformity or resistance may lead to modifications in institutional processes (Oliver, 1991) . Because of the shift from central planning to the market system, banking regulations were unavailable or simply non-existent. It appeared to be in the interests of government officers to modify the initial rules according to the interests of the broader society and organizational players. This process involved multiple competing institutions as solutions to certain problems of banking. However, new problems emerged from previous solutions and different political interests. The emergence of the commercial banking field thus can be conceptualized as a series of political solutions given to emerging issues.
Third, though most prior studies on transition economies provided tests of theories developed in other research settings, our study is mainly a problem-driven work. In contrast to testing previous theoretical frameworks, we focused on explaining how commercial banking developed through underlying political mechanisms. This approach is particularly helpful in understanding the open-ended process of economic transitions. Although the field's development led to several positive changes, such as improved services, European Union policies, and a defined banking model, political manoeuvring by government officers and bank managers also resulted in further ownership changes and reduced independence for local banks. Understanding the actual development processes of commercial banking in transition economies over time may help to explain more recent events in this sector including acquisitions by multinational banks, spin-offs, and service changes.
Limitations and Future Research
Selecting settings in which there is an intense interaction between different actors after a discontinuous change may enhance theory on the development of organizational fields. Most previous studies on institutions, including studies on commercial banking (e.g. Davis and Mizruchi, 1999) , have been done in developed markets, and these settings offer limited opportunity to study regulations and organizations emerging together. The Hungarian and Czech experience can be used to understand core political processes in different fields in other countries. Governments in other countries of the former Eastern Bloc and many emerging countries may experience a similar pattern of institutional development to the one described in the context of commercial banking. Nonetheless, there are important institutional variations among organizational fields and countries undergoing transition. The consideration of different political interests helps the search for context-specific formulas in different countries and facilitates their open-ended economic developments.
Because we focused on political interests associated with critical banking policy issues, examining the banking sectors in two countries jointly provided important advantages. Nonetheless, there are important differences in the approaches to macroeconomic transition between the Czech Republic and Hungary. In addition to differences in their starting conditions in the early 1990s, traditions as well as multifaceted political and macroeconomic changes have resulted in variations in the development of the two countries and their banking sectors. In the case of the Czech Republic, for example, the banks' role in enterprise privatization might be an important factor (Brom and Orenstein, 1994) . Whereas Hungarian banks have not been directly involved in the privatization of other industries, the institutional development of the banking sector has been influenced by changes in ownership in local firms. As commercial banking in the two countries develops, researchers are expected to find increasing differences in their institutional development. Furthermore, the consideration of broader macroeconomic changes could provide interesting evidence on the banks' impact on the development of other sectors and thus in the future directions of country development. Another potential area of extension is the role of regional political interests. Though the markets in both Hungary and the Czech Republic are relatively small, interests in regional centres in countries with large consumer markets, such as Russia and China, may play a critical role in shaping of fields.
Different political interests may have simultaneous influence on the development of organizational fields. Although we sought to capture the central problems of commercial banking in transition economies, the scope of our study required us to simplify the field's development. Focusing on the solutions offered to a limited number of problems allowed us to present the dialectics of political interests during the development of commercial banking. Future research would do well by showing the messy simultaneity of conflicting political interests in the construction of different organizational fields.
We studied the interaction of political interests at the field-state boundary. Norms and rules, however, can be found at different spheres in society, including the individual and the state. Furthermore, our selection of institutions can be justified by the highly regulated nature of banking; this sector tends to be governed by formal laws and regulations at the state level (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999) . Our approach of focusing on formal institutions, nevertheless, is somewhat limited considering the potential role of informal norms in fields. Whereas commercial banking has been a relatively young field in transition economies, informal constraints may become more influential as the field develops. Knowledge and cultural values in more mature fields may function as substitutes for underdeveloped formal institutions (North, 1990) . The role of informal constraints may be studied across different fields and by means of ethnographic and other methods. For example, researchers studying the development of higher education in transition economies may be able to provide evidence on individual level variations as well as the effects of informal norms.
Further research may also examine the interests of a broader range of institutional constituents, such as employees, unions, customers, or local communities. A related area for research is the study of social movement effects on institutional change. Because movements take time to organize, their role in the early stages of commercial banking was limited. Social movements organized around shared political interests of customer groups and non-governmental organizations might be effective means to alter the rules of organizational fields.
Beyond focusing on adaptive changes, the evolution of commercial banking in transition economies might well be explained by theories rooted in the selection perspective.
The examination of banks and government agencies provided us with an opportunity to understand how different political interests shaped the field. Our research focused on the cognition and adaptive responses of actors, and this approach is preferred in the investigation of institutional change in an emerging field. Once the field has developed, however, researchers may be able to look at the organizational population from a distance and thus uncover patterns of change through further organizational entry and exit. [1] According to institutional theory, both formal and informal constraints can be powerful institutions (North, 1990) . In this paper, we focus on regulatory structures, a subset of formal institutions. Focusing on formal institutions appears to be appropriate in the context of banking industry. Because of its macroeconomic importance, the banking sector tends to be highly regulated and thus governed by formal laws.
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